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Abstract 
Two-part tariffs, when used at the retail level, increase efficiency by lowering the price of marginal 
units. The same potential for higher efficiency exists for two-part tariffs at wholesale level for a given 
market structure, but the fixed part of the wholesale tariff can negatively affect the latter. In a 
simulated competition model of next-generation telecommunications access networks that has been 
calibrated with engineering cost data, we show that the latter effects strongly outweigh the former. 
That is, substituting a cost-based linear wholesale access tariff with revenue-equivalent two-part 
tariffs reduces the number of access seekers and therefore leads to higher prices and lower welfare 
and consumer surplus. 
1. Introduction 
Since the “marginal cost controversy” initiated by Coase (1946) two-part tariffs have played a 
prominent role in the literature on optimal price regulation. Coase had argued that marginal cost 
prices proposed by Hotelling (1938) and others would lead to deficits that would need to be covered 
by distortionary taxes, while two-part tariffs would allow cost coverage without further distortions. 
Later work showed that this first-best outcome only results in those cases where no customer is 
excluded by the fixed fee. However, two-part tariffs could still be welfare-superior to any linear 
tariffs (Willig, 1978) and could easily be implemented in practice.  
This very positive view of two-part tariffs, however, does not necessarily extend to regulated input 
prices. The reason, first worked out by Ordover and Panzar (1980 and 1982), is that firms purchasing 
inputs compete with each other so that the two-part tariffs may influence and possibly distort this 
competition. Nevertheless, given that over time price regulation has become less and less an issue of 
final goods markets and more and more an issue of bottleneck inputs and given that many of these 
bottlenecks involve very high fixed costs and low marginal costs, linear input prices may be quite 
inefficient and two-part tariffs for inputs therefore appear to be desirable.  
This problem exists, for example, for next generation telecommunications access networks in the 
form of fiber-to-the-home (FTTH) that are being built from scratch. In this case the network provider 
has to build out whole geographic areas independent of who subscribes to the network. This 
involves very high fixed (and sunk) costs, while the costs of connecting individual subscribers are 
quite low. We are here concentrating on the GPON technology.1 Wholesale access can in this case be 
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 The two currently most relevant architectures for FTTH are Ethernet Point-to-Point (P2P) and GPON. A P2P 
FTTH fiber architecture deploys individual fiber access lines from a Metropolitan Point of Presence (MPoP) to 
each customer home. In contrast, the GPON technology is designed for Point-to-Multipoint fiber plants. It 
concentrates the traffic of a significant number of customer access fibers at an intermediate optical splitter 
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provided via bitstream access. Under linear access charges the access seekers would pay a monthly 
fee per subscriber, which is usually based on the long-run average incremental costs (LRIC) of access 
and which is much higher than the marginal cost of access. This can involve a substantial allocative 
distortion. If, in contrast, the fixed costs (or a large fraction of them) are distributed via the fixed fee 
of a two-part tariff the variable fee can approach marginal costs, potentially leading to lower prices 
for end users. This allocative efficiency effect is the great advantage of such a two-part tariff. On the 
other hand, the large fixed fee combined with the lower end-user prices may induce some 
competitors to exit the market. This would reduce competition, leading to an anti-competitive 
effect. In the current paper we will use numerical simulations in a realistic context of GPON FTTH 
access to show the interaction of these two effects. 
The next section briefly reviews the literature on two-part wholesale access tariffs. Section 3 then 
describes the background of the numeric modeling approach. Section 4 provides and discusses the 
results. The paper ends with brief conclusions. 
2. Literature review 
Compared to the extensive literature on two-part tariffs in general and even to the literature on 
regulated two-part tariffs for end users, the literature on two-part tariffs for inputs appears to be 
very small. The above-mentioned article by Ordover and Panzar (1982) set the stage by establishing 
that “…for the empirically relevant class of production processes in which the purchased input is 
required in fixed proportion to output…a two-part tariff is never optimal from either a profit or 
welfare maximizing standpoint.” They show this for the case of perfect downstream competition and 
with the monopolistic input supplier only operating upstream. In contrast, we will look at the case of 
imperfect downstream competition with a vertically integrated input supplier and with a further 
integrated supplier, who does not sell the essential input. 
Panzar and Sibley (1989) come closer to our problem by analyzing an industry with an upstream 
monopoly and imperfect competition downstream and with a regulator who tries to influence 
downstream outcomes indirectly by regulating only the bottleneck input price but who has to leave 
the retail pricing to the input buyers. It turns out that, if the number of downstream firms is fixed 
and if the upstream and downstream firms earn positive profits the welfare optimal two-part access 
charge involves a variable access charge below marginal cost. This is because the two-part tariff can 
then correct for the imperfect competition result downstream.  However, with free entry 
downstream the variable welfare-optimal access charge will be larger (smaller) than marginal cost of 
access if at the market equilibrium there exist locally decreasing (increasing) returns downstream.2 
This latter result is somewhat artificial, though, since it is derived under the assumption that the 
number n of firms is large enough so that (a) differentiation of welfare with respect to n is feasible 
and (b) the free entry equilibrium involves zero profits for the downstream firms (contestability). 
Implicitly, these results reverse those of Ordover and Panzar (1982) because a linear tariff can be 
viewed as a special kind of two-part tariff with a fixed access charge A = 0. Thus, the introduction of 
market imperfections downstream may change the previous negative results and may leave open if 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
location (Distribution Point) onto a single feeder fiber that then leads to the MPoP. The GPON technology is 
less costly than P2P but also provides substantially lower speed and less security/reliability.  
2
With free entry, the optimal variable access charge a will be equal to marginal costs if there are locally 
constant returns downstream. 
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two-part tariffs for regulated inputs will improve regulation over linear access charges. In contrast to 
Panzar and Sibley (1989) we here deal with a limited number of downstream firms offering 
differentiated services. In this case free-entry equilibria can involve positive downstream profits (but 
no losses).3 
Some other works analyze regulated two-part tariffs for inputs as regulatory tools for specific 
purposes. For example, Laffont and Tirole (1993) use the fixed part of a two-part tariff as a device for 
turning government subsidies used for providing incentives in a principal-agent framework into a 
self-financing device. Vogelsang (2001) uses two-part tariffs as incentive devices for electricity 
transmission regulation. In this case, the purchasing load-serving entities (LSE) downstream may not 
necessarily compete with each other. Another example is Brito et al. (2009), who use two-part tariffs 
on inputs to induce an incumbent to invest in new infrastructure. Inderst and Shaffer (2009) 
consider discriminatory two-part tariffs for inputs as a device for favoring more productive over less 
productive downstream firms.  
A few works describe regulated two-part input tariffs in practice. Some initial non-linear pricing of 
telecommunications carrier access is described in Mitchell and Vogelsang (1991). Examples of other 
industries, such as gas, railroads and electricity are found in Biggar (2001). The latter author points 
out that non-linear input pricing is common in those industries but not so common in 
telecommunications. Nevertheless, we concentrate our numerical example on the latter.   
3. Modeling background 
 
In order to demonstrate the effects of regulated two-part tariff access charges on prices, 
competition, profits and welfare we draw upon the combination of a costing and competition model 
from Hoernig et al. (2010 and 2012). The basic structure of the model is given by Figure 1. The 
numeric cost model calculates cost functions (a) for an FTTH incumbent providing bitstream access 
to FTTH entrants and retail services to end users, (b) for an open number of symmetric FTTH 
entrants, and (c) for cable as an alternative vertically integrated network provider, who does not 
offer access to others. The cost model 
Figure 1: Overview of modeling framework 
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Valletti (1998) analyzes regulated non-linear access tariffs for two given downstream firms competing in a 
Cournot framework. 
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Source: Hoernig et al. (2010) 
 
also calculates bitstream access charges, based on cost coverage for a predicted output quantity for 
FTTH access (which includes the incumbent). The cost functions then feed into a numeric 
competition model that allows for product differentiation among all competitors and that can be run 
with varying numbers of entrants in order to allow for a free entry and free exit feature. We here 
only provide the barest description of the models and ask the interested reader to consult Hoernig 
et al. (2010) or the shorter version in Hoernig et al. (2012) for more detailed information.  
The cost model is built for a generic European country named “Euroland” that is divided into 8 areas 
called clusters ordered by declining network density.  For purposes of the current modeling exercise 
we only include the densest four clusters in order to assure viability of a GPON FTTH network with 
bitstream-dependent entrants. Only the GPON access network is fully modeled, while the cable 
network’s cost function for clusters 1-4 is assumed based on our assessment after discussions with 
industry experts. Assuming linear bitstream charges the cost functions are given in Table 1. The cost 
functions are split between the access and concentration network stage and the downstream stage  
Table 1: Cost functions as inputs to the competition model  
 Fibre investor Fibre bitstream entrant Cable 
NetCo fixed cost per month 94M € 0 € 20M € 
NetCo var. cost per 
subscriber 
6.52 € 22.05 € 
(bitstream charge) 
12.00 € 
OpCo fixed cost per month 2.7M € 2.7M €  
OpCo var. cost per 
subscriber 
9.94 € 10.57 €  
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(including, in particular, the core networks and retail costs) as if the incumbent and entrants were 
(for accounting purposes) separated vertically into a “NetCo” and an “OpCo”.4 A specific feature of 
telecommunications networks is that economies of scale not only persist in the access network but 
extend to the concentration and core networks. Thus, even if entrants buy bitstream access at linear 
prices they face economies of scale, which limit the viable number of firms. 
Besides cost functions the competition model requires demand functions as crucial inputs. The 
numeric competition model used is based on the pyramid model (von Ungern-Sternberg, 1991), 
which is an extension of the Hotelling model to multiple firms. It therefore has a linear demand 
structure, where demand slopes are given by “transport costs” of equally-distributed customers to 
their preferred supplier and where the height is given by the valuation of customers located exactly 
at node locations. We determined the latter valuations (as willingness to pay = WtP) from expert 
assessments of ARPUs5 for known services (single play, double play, triple play and business services) 
and assumptions about their composition and quality of service for the three types of players. We 
also gave the incumbent a goodwill advantage over entrants. The resulting WtP values assumed are 
shown in Table 2.  
Table 2: Willingness-to-pay assumptions 
Incumbent 
WtP 
Cable 
WtP 
Entrant WtP 
90 82  83 
 
The transport cost parameters were determined from a priori considerations about closeness of 
substitution and by consistency requirements of the model (results should be consistent when 
access charges or the number of entrants change). The numeric competition model runs were only 
for the last stage of the competition game, where prices and quantities were determined for a given 
number of entrants and for given access charges. The previous stage determines the number of 
entrants and the stage before that determines the access charge. Thus, if in the last stage all 
entrants are profitable the model is run with a larger number of entrants. Conversely, if the 
(symmetric) entrants all make losses the model run is repeated with one less entrant. The model 
provides as outputs the prices charged by all firms, their market shares, their profits, consumer 
surplus and welfare. 
For the purpose of testing the effects of two-part tariffs we had to determine an equivalence 
between linear and two-part tariffs as well as between various two-part tariff options. We did this by 
starting with the original linear tariff and assuming that any two-part tariff to be compared should – 
at the same output - generate the same revenue as the linear tariff. Here we made a simplification 
that has some influence on the result but is quite realistic in describing what regulators actually do. 
It is that the regulated charge is based on a given expected quantity of output for which it just covers 
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 We here assume that bitstream access is provided at the core network node. It could also be provided at the 
MPoP. 
5
 ARPUs are average revenues per user, which are commonly used as a measure of price levels achieved by 
firms, given the heterogeneity of their service offerings. 
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the costs (LRIC) of the incumbent. This fixed projected quantity will in general differ from the 
equilibrium quantity resulting from the model.6 
4. Model results 
Table 3 gives the basic model result for the case of the linear bitstream charge of a = 22.05 € as 
calculated by the cost model. As can be seen the equilibrium number of firms is N = 6, meaning there 
are 4 entrants besides the incumbent and the cable network. Due to higher WtP for the incumbent’s 
services the end-user price for the incumbent is clearly higher than that of the entrants in spite of 
the incumbent’s lower downstream cost. Cable has somewhat lower prices than both other types of 
firms, due to low marginal costs and low WtP. Nevertheless, cable profits are highest, due to low 
fixed costs along with low marginal costs and due to the large cable market share. The significantly 
lower profits of the incumbent are explained by the wholesale loss and by lower output that 
somewhat compensates the high downstream margin. The wholesale loss derives from the slightly 
higher than expected market share of cable, which was assumed to be 30% when calculating the 
bitstream access charge but turned out to be 31%.7 Profits of entrants are low to moderate, 
indicating that the equilibrium may be close to a situation with one less entrant. Welfare consists 
mostly of consumer surplus with about 7% derived from profits. 
Table 3: Basic model results for linear bitstream charge 
Bitstream access charge a = given = 22.05 € 
  
 
General Incumbent Cable Each Entrant 
Number of firms 6 
   End-user prices 
 
40.31 € 28.32 € 37.67 € 
Profits  
 
12.6M € 23.9M € 2.3M € 
Wholesale profits 
 
-1.6M € 
  Market shares 
 
0.23 0.31 0.11 
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 In Hoernig et al. (2010) the linear access charge is also endogenized as a special case. Such endogenized 
access charges may have superior welfare properties, as argued by Klumpp and Su (2010). However, Klumpp 
and Su compute “revenue-neutral” access charges, i.e. LRIC at equilibrium. They are different from 
“endogenous” access charges as defined by Fjell et al. (2010) and used in Nitsche and Wiethaus (2010). The 
latter two papers assume that access charges change with quantities out of equilibrium, and firms take their 
influence on access charges into account (Boffa and Panzar, 2012, use the same idea). Therefore 
“endogenous” access charges have better welfare properties than “revenue-neutral” ones. They are, however, 
difficult to calculate in practice. We briefly discuss below how our results for two-part tariffs change under 
endogenized access charges. 
7
 Note that as in the Hotelling model the total number of subscribers to all the firms is fixed. For the first four 
clusters it is 8.64 M. As a result, only the distribution of customers between firms is affected by pricing. 
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Welfare 446M € 
   Consumer surplus 413M € 
    
In the following we consider the effects of using two-part wholesale access tariffs instead of linear 
access charges.  
Two-part access tariffs are calculated on the basis of long-run average incremental costs (LRIC) for 
the projected outputs. Defining K0 as the total fixed cost of FTTH access, c0 as average variable cost 
of access, Q0 as the total expected access quantity purchased by entrants and self-provided to the 
incumbent’s downstream OpCo, and n as the total number of firms using the FTTH access 
technology. Then total LRIC is the sum of variable and fixed costs of FTTH access, K0 + c0Q0, which has 
to equal access revenue under two-part tariffs, An + aQ0. Therefore, A = (K + (c – a)Q)/n. We can 
then vary the variable access charge ‘a’ and generate fixed fees ‘A’ in such a way that LRIC is 
achieved for the projected output.8 
In Figure 2 the vertical axis gives both the fixed fee (red line) and the access quantity (the green and 
blue lines). The steep downward-sloping red line shows the relationship between the fixed fee and 
the variable fee for the regulated two-part tariff based on three entrants. The starting point on the 
right side is the linear tariff with a variable fee of a = 22.05€ and a fixed fee A = 0. On the left side we 
can see that a reduction of the variable fee to about 6€ requires a fixed fee of about 24M€, given 
that there are 4 wholesale users (incumbent plus three entrants). We have calculated two-part 
tariffs so that, at the assumed quantity of output, their revenue would cover LRIC. Since the actual 
access quantity decreases in the variable access charge, the revenue from a two-part tariff with a 
lower variable access charge will therefore exceed LRIC, as long as ‘a’ sufficiently exceeds the 
variable access costs. The two almost parallel horizontal lines give the projected and the actual 
access quantities (on the same scale as the monetary values on the left scale). The projected access 
quantity is the total quantity (8.64 M subscribers) times 70% or about 6.05M subscribers. However, 
because the initial market share of cable at a = 22.05€ is larger than expected the total access 
quantity is smaller than expected. Furthermore, because cable’s market share declines as ‘a’ 
declines the actual access quantity increases slightly (for a given total number of firms) for a 
reduction in a.  
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 Here we assume that one fixed fee is paid for the whole area under consideration. Alternative assumptions 
could be made, e.g. one fixed fee per upstream access point, one fixed fee per city or region, etc. The market 
outcomes for these different cases should differ. 
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Figure 2: Characterization of two-part access tariffs with three entrants 
 
In the following we first continue to fix the number of entrants to n = 3, which is one less than the 
free-entry equilibrium under linear access tariffs. We do this in order to show the benefits of two-
part access tariffs without considering the potential anti-competitive effects. 
Figure 3 shows that retail prices of all firms change monotonically with the reduction in variable 
access charges going along with an increase in fixed fees. Retail prices of entrants are a little more 
sensitive to the variable access charge than those of the incumbent and substantially more sensitive 
than those of cable. Overall, two-part tariffs have the asserted effects of bringing end-user prices 
closer to marginal costs.  
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Figure 3: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on retail prices with 3 entrants 
 
As Figure 4 demonstrates, in line with the price developments the entrants’ market share increases 
at the expense of cable while that of the incumbent stays almost constant.9 
Figure 4: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on market shares with 3 entrants 
 
Figure 5 shows that all profits decline as the access charge is reduced. Furthermore, the entrants’ 
profits become negative at a variable access charge of about a = 15€. Wholesale profits are non-
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 Note that there are three entrants, each gaining about 5% market share. 
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negative between about a = 6 € and a = 21 €. The line for the incumbent’s overall profits is concave 
because wholesale profit are concave and retail profits increase linearly in a. 
Figure 5: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on profits with 3 entrants 
 
Two-part tariffs change the entrants’ marginal costs that are relevant for pricing decisions. A similar 
reasoning holds for the incumbent because wholesale access charges are opportunity costs in the 
sense that selling at wholesale is the next best alternative to selling at retail.10 If the variable access 
fee is reduced, the resulting lower prices of incumbent and entrants lead the cable supplier to 
reduce its prices as well but not by enough to keep its market share. Entrants cannot benefit from 
the “scale economies“ provided by two-part tariffs but rather only suffer from the increase in fixed 
costs. Summing up, for a given number of firms the economies of scale introduced by two-part 
wholesale access tariffs make competition fiercer, leading to lower profits of all firms. 
Figure 6 gives the non-surprising result that consumer surplus strongly decreases as the tariff 
becomes more linear. However, total welfare is almost constant, because the consumer surplus 
increase due to lower end-user prices is compensated by lower profits.  
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 They are generally not the exact opportunity costs of the incumbent for access used internally as an input 
for its downstream services. For the exact opportunity costs see DeGraba (2003).  
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Figure 6: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on welfare and consumer surplus with 3 
entrants 
 
We now turn to the situation with free entry and exit, where an equilibrium is defined by positive 
profits for all firms and by negative profits for entrants if the number of entrants is increased by one. 
Figure 5 above already showed that the viability of three entrants is threatened very quickly when ‘a’ 
is reduced and ‘A’ increases accordingly. Thus, as ‘a’ is reduced more and more the number of firms 
in the market declines, leading to new equilibria with less competition. Figure 7 shows the drastic 
consequences of this case for the resulting end-user prices. Starting at a = 22.05 € the variable 
access charge is decreased and the fixed charge increased accordingly. The resulting reduction in 
retail prices leads to a reduction of entrants, starting from four down to one. Each time the number 
of entrants is reduced prices jump up for all firms. While, as in the previous analysis, the prices 
decline, as long as the number of entrants stays fixed, the overall trend of prices is upward, when 
variable access charges are reduced and fixed charges increased accordingly. 
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Figure 7: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on retail prices with free entry 
 
Figure 8 shows that market shares are influenced by an interaction of prices and the number of 
firms. Just as in Figure 4 market shares of cable decrease and of entrants increase when a is reduced 
but the number of firms stays constant. However, a reduction in the number of entrants makes the 
incumbent’s and cable’s market share jump upward. While the same happens to the entrants’ 
individual market shares, the sum of entrants’ market shares is reduced by exit. Because in the range 
between a = 6 € and a = 21€ cable’s market share is below the 30% assumed for setting the access 
charge at LRIC, the access charges are actually too high in this range and correct or slightly too low 
for a < 6 €  and a > 21€. We have calculated endogenously determined access charge so that 
wholesale profit vanishes. This slightly increases the initial a from a = 22.05 € to a = 22.38 €. It 
otherwise only affects the distribution of profits between incumbent and entrants and the levels of a 
at which entrants leave the market. These are changed by 0.10-0.60 €. 
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Figure 8: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on market shares with free entry 
 
Similar effects as those on prices can be seen on profits in Figure 9. As the variable access charge is 
reduced and the fixed charge increased, profits decline, unless exit occurs, when they jump up. In 
general, cable is the greatest beneficiary of two-part tariffs. The incumbent suffers from reductions 
in wholesale profits. The remaining entrants strongly benefit from the reduction in the number of 
entrants. 
Figure 9: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on profits with free entry 
 
Figure 10 combines these results to give consumer surplus and welfare effects. Although, for a given 
number of firms, consumer surplus increases for reductions in variable access charges, the effect of 
exit of firms on average more than compensates for this benefit. Since exit of firms increases total 
profits substantially, this also increases the share of profits in total welfare. From the graphs it 
appears that in the simulated case welfare unambiguously suffers from the introduction of two-part 
access tariffs. This is not quite correct, because in some range welfare increases slightly if the 
variable access charge decreases as long as no firm exits. These increases in welfare are, however, 
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too small to be visible in the graph. They are about 0.1-0.2% for every Euro reduction in a. In 
contrast, the exit of an entrant triggers a more visible reduction in welfare. This is surprising insofar 
as the exit reduces total fixed costs and has no effect on total output. Thus, the main effect here is 
that substitution occurs away from the more efficient technology (FTTH) towards the less efficient 
technology (cable).  
Figure 10: Effects of two-part wholesale access tariffs on welfare and consumer surplus with free 
entry 
 
5. Conclusions 
The main result of our numerical simulation has been that two-part wholesale access tariffs can lead 
to a reduction in the number of service competitors and can thereby have strongly anti-competitive 
effects, leading to sharply lower consumer surplus and mildly lower welfare. This result was certainly 
enhanced by the fact that in our model economies of scale existed even before the linear access 
charges were converted into genuine two-part access tariffs. In our model two-part access tariffs 
were beneficial to consumers and for welfare in general only in a small range between a = 22.05€ 
and a = 19.85€,11 where no exit of entrants occurs. In this range the fixed fee A remains quite low 
but, at a = 19.85€ it nevertheless reaches about A  2.7M €. This, however, more than doubles the 
entrants’ fixed costs downstream. 
Since our model applies only to a specific industry further research should find out to what extent 
these results generalize to other network industries with similar bottleneck access problems.  In the 
context of FTTH access one might also consider more localized fixed fees (at access points, or in 
specific regions) and calculate the effects on local market structure and how access charges could be 
tailored to local conditions. 
                                                          
11
 Note that with free entry and exit entrant 4 exits at 19.85, but in figure 5, where exit occurs at 15, there are 
only three entrants present – see figure 9. 
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